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Time, Place, and Manner
Regulations of Expressive
Activities in the Public Forum
Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost a half-century has passed since the United States
Supreme Court initially recognized that the first amendment' op-
erates as a shield protecting speech activities in public places.2
Prodded by religious and political groups 3 who sought to promote
1. U.S. CONST. amend. L The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof. or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances." Id.
2. The earliest Supreme Court cases which extended first amendment protec-
tion to speech activities in public places were: Schneider v. New Jersey, 308
U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell
v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). For a discussion of Hague and Schnei-
der, see notes 27-31, 73 & accompanying text infra.
3. Members of the Jehovah's Witnesses were almost solely responsible for the
influx of first amendment cases in the Supreme Court during the 1930's and
1940's. Because of the religious nature of this organization, these cases in-
cluded both free speech and free exercise first amendment claims. See
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (use of the streets of a company-owned
town to distribute literature); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) (flag salute); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
(handbilling); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (handbilling); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (handbilling and denouncing other re-
ligions); Cox v. New Hamphsire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (parades); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (solicitation of contributions); Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (leafletting); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938) (handbilling). See generally Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,
273-89 (1951), a decision reversing the conviction of two Jehovah's Witnesses
on disorderly conduct charges after they conducted bible readings in a public
park without first obtaining a permit, in which Justice Frankfurter analyzed
the first amendment principles established by the Court in the Witnesses'
cases.
Since the mid-1970's, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
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their causes by communicating their views in public places to
whomever would listen, the Court has taken up the task of defining
what publicly owned facilities are to remain open to expressive ac-
tivities and what government regulation of speech activities in
those facilities is constitutionally permissible.
Publicly owned facilities which are to remain open to expres-
sive activities are known as public forums.4 This classification
serves as constitutional shorthand for the proposition that, in addition to
its usual obligation of content-neutrality (an obligation that exists
whether or not a public forum is involved), government cannot regulate
speech-related conduct in such places except in narrow ways shown to be
necessary to serve significant governmental interests.
5
In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc.,6 the Court confronted the issue of whether a state fair regula-
tion which confined the distribution of literature and solicitation of
contributions by members of the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness (ISKCON)7 to leased booths on the fairgrounds
was a constitutionally permissible restriction on speech activity in
a public forum. The Court's conclusion that the booth rule was a
reasonable time, place, and manner regulation, promoting the al-
leged government interest in crowd control and public safety,8 in-
Inc., has assumed the role of chief advocate of first amendment protection for
speech activities in public places. For a discussion of the most significant of
the Krishna cases, see notes 58-61 & accompanying text infra. In addressing
the controversial beliefs and practices of members of the International Soci-
ety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., Judge Pell of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit observed: "Distaste for what is being expressed, and
often absolute revulsion, appear to be the hallmarks of the exercise of First
Amendment rights and probably are the necessary contexts in which the
preservation of those rights can be firmly assured." International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979).
4. L TRIBE, AmERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 689 (1978) (footnote omitted).
5. Id. (footnote omitted).
6. 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981).
7. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness, a non-profit New York
corporation, was organized in the late 1960's to promote the Indian and Hindu
religion of Vaisnavism. Amicae Curie Brief for the Indian Cultural Society at
1, Heifron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct.
2559 (1981). An essential element of Vaisnavism is the practice of sankirtan,
a ritual which emphasizes the distribution of religious tracts and the solicita-
tion of contributions to support ISKCON's temples and educational activities.
Id. at 3. The booth rule, as interpreted by the Minnesota Agricultural Soci-
ety, would allow ISKCON members to proselytize in any of the open areas of
the fairgrounds but confine their practice of sankirtan to fixed leased loca-
tions. 101 S. Ct. at 2561-62. ISKCON claimed that the ritual of sankirtan is
peripatetic in nature and that its proper practice required that the devotee
move around. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron,
299 N.W.2d 79, 83 n.7 (Minn. 1980).
8. 101 S. Ct. at 2567.
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dicates a need to reexamine the Court's previous decisions
involving such traditional modes of constitutionally protected
speech as the distribution of literature and solicitation of contribu-
tions in a public forum.9 This Note presents such an examination
and a critical analysis of the Heffron decision.
II. THE HEFFRON FACTS
In August 1977, ISKCON brought suit in the district court of
Ramsey County, Minnesota against the Secretary of the Minnesota
Agricultural Society, Michael Heffron, seeking an injunction
against the enforcement at the upcoming state fair of the Society's
booth rule.10 That rule provided, in relevant part, that the "'[s] ale
or distribution of any merchandise, including printed or written
material except under license issued [by] the Society and/or from
a duly-licensed location shall be a misdemeanor.' "I' The Agricul-
tural Society interpreted the rule as requiring that all distributions
of literature and solicitations of contributions on the fairgrounds
be conducted from fixed, leased locations.' 2 Claiming that the rule
violated its members' first amendment rights under the free exer-
cise and freedom of speech clauses, ISKCON was granted its re-
quest for a temporary restraining order.' 3 However, in August
1978, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
9. A reexamination is in order because of the Heffron Court's departure from
the analysis pertinent to public forum cases established in Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), and its predecessors. For a discussion of that
departure, see notes 100-11 & accompanying text infra.
10. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79,
82 (Minn. 1980).
11. Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05, quoted in Heifron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559, 2561 (1981). The Rule was
promulgated pursuant to MNN. STAT. ANN. § 37.16 (West 1981) which author-
ized the Society to make "bylaws, ordinances and rules, not inconsistent with
law, which it may deem necessary or proper for the government of the fair
grounds."
12. 101 S. Ct. at 2561-62.
13. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79,
82 (Minn. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981). While the Minnesota Supreme
Court ultimately held in favor of ISKCON, it was reversed on appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. It is possible that counsel for ISKCON made a
tactical error in not including a claim of a violation of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion. Article 1, section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution provides: '"he liberty
of the press shall forever remain inviolate, and all persons may freely speak,
write and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of such right." MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 3. If the Minnesota Supreme
Court had been given the opportunity to decide ISKCON's claim under a
state constitutional provision, the decision may have been unreviewable by
the United States Supreme Court. The doctrine of independent and ade-
quate state grounds denies the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state
court decisions based upon state law adequate to support the judgment, even
1982]
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judgment.14 The court addressed only ISKCON's free speech
claims and found the booth rule to be a reasonable regulation of
the manner and place of ISKCON's proselytizing and soliciting ac-
tivities; thus, it enjoined ISKCON from violating the rule.15
On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court,16 ISKCON's dual
claims under the free exercise and freedom of speech clauses re-
ceived blurred treatment.'7 While the court questioned whether
the booth rule was a reasonable manner and place regulation of
expressive activity,18 it placed a burden upon the state fair officials
if a federal question exists. Fox Film Corp. v. Mueller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935);
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
Justice Brennan, recognizing the growing importance of state constitu-
tional civil rights provisions, has stated:
The essential point I am making, of course, is not that the United
States Supreme Court is necessarily wrong in its interpretation of
the federal Constitution, or that ultimate constitutional truths invari-
ably come prepackaged in the dissents, including my own, from deci-
sions of the Court. It is simply that the decisions of the Court are
not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guar-
anteed by counterpart provisions of state law. Accordingly, such de-
cisions are not mechanically applicable to state law issues, and state
court judges and the members of the bar seriously err if they so treat
them. Rather, state court judges, and also practitioners, do well to
scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if they
are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due
regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitu-
tional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight as
guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees. I sug-
gest to the bar that, although in the past it might have been safe for
counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state courts,
plainly it would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state
constitutional questions.
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977) (footnote omitted).
14. 299 N.W.2d at 82.
15. See id. at 82 n.4. The trial court rejected ISKCON's free exercise claims.
16. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heifron, 299 N.W.2d 79
(Minn. 1980).
17. Claims under the free exercise clause are treated in a much different manner
than those under the freedom of speech clause. In a free exercise case, when
a state regulation interferes with a religious practice, the state must show a
compelling state interest which justifies the application of that regulation
against the practitioners of the religion. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214
(1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). The remedy for a free
exercise clause violation is to exempt the individual whose belief is being
infringed by a state regulation from that regulation. The remedy in a success-
ful freedom of speech attack upon a state regulation is the invalidation of the
regulation. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment,
444 U.S. 620 (1980); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
18. 299 N.W.2d at 83. Under the normal formulation of the test for the constitu-
tional validity of a regulation of speech activity in a public place, regulation of
the time, place, and manner of speaking is permissible within certain guide-
lines. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). See notes 40-44 &
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to show that exempting ISKCON from the rule would significantly
impair the state's concededly significant interest in conducting an
orderly, safe state fair.19 The state failed to make the requisite
showing and as a result, the Minnesota Supreme Court exempted
ISKCON from the booth rule's operation. The court's merging of
two distinct first amendment tests and granting of a free exercise
clause remedy rendered the case ripe for the United States
Supreme Court's granting of the state official's petition for a writ of
certiorari.20
In the United States Supreme Court, the free exercise issue
was ignored; the Court framed the issue so as to question whether
the booth rule was a reasonable time, place, and manner regula-
tion of speech activity in the public areas of the fairgrounds.21
Under this freedom of speech formulation of the issue, the Court
rejected the Minnesota Supreme Court's free exercise clause rem-
edy.22 Finding the rule to be a reasonable one serving the state's
interest in conducting an orderly fair, the Court, in a 5-4 decision,
reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court.23 A proper analysis of the
Court's decision necessarily involves an examination of the
Court's previous treatment of public forum cases.
accompanying text infra for the applicable guidelines. Since no regulation of
time was involved in the booth rule, the Minnesota court shortened the
formula, dropping out the time consideration.
19. 299 N.W.2d at 83. This burden is akin to that imposed upon the state when it
seeks to justify a regulation under a free exercise attack. See note 17 supra.
20. Heifron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 299 N.W.2d 79
(Minn. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 917 (1981). The Court had previously
denied certiorari in a case involving almost identical facts, International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Bbwen, 600 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979). ISKCON prevailed in this case in which the court
found that the state's significant interest in crowd control and safety on the
fairgrounds could be adequately served by a less restrictive regulation on
ISKCON's solicitation activities than confinement to a booth. Id. at 669. Two
other circuit courts have ruled on the same issue, both in ISKCON's favor.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d
Cir. 1981) (ISKCON exempted from a booth rule on free exercise grounds);
Edwards v. Maryland State Fair & Agricultural Soc'y, 628 F.2d 282 (4th Cir.
1980) (state officials enjoined from enforcing a booth rule against all solicitors
of contributions and distributors of literature on free speech grounds).
21. 101 S. Ct. at 2564.
22. Id. at 2566.
23. Id. at 2568. Justice White authored the majority opinion. There were two par-
tially dissenting opinions. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 2658. Justice Blackmun dissented on his own.
Id. at 2572. All four dissenters concurred with the portion of the majority
opinion which upheld the constitutionality of the rule as applied to the sale of
literature and the solicitation of funds. They dissented with respect to the
application of the rule to the distribution of literature.
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TI. PUBLIC FORUM BACKGROUND
A. Origin of Public Forum Constitutional Protection
First amendment protection for speech activity in public places
is of relatively recent constitutional vintage.24 Until the mid-1930's,
the Court was seemingly committed to the notion that the Consti-
tution offered persons no protection from arbitrary government
prohibitions of speech activities on the streets and in other public
places. For example, in Davis v. Massachusetts,25 a public forum
case decided near the turn of the century, the Court affirmed a
minister's conviction of the violation of a Boston ordinance which
prohibited making a public address without a permit from the
Mayor. The minister had claimed that the ordinance, which vested
arbitrary authority in the Mayor to issue a permit, violated his first
and fourteenth amendment rights of freedom of speech and due
process of law. In rejecting his claims, the Court stated in dictum:
"The right to absolutely exclude all right to use [publicly owned
property], necessarily includes the authority to determine under
what circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater
power contains the lesser."26
The property rights orientation inherent in the Davis dictum,
indicating that the state, as owner of publicly held property, has
vast discretion in how that property may be used, was argued
again forty years later in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organ-
ization.27 In Hague, the Court addressed the claims of labor or-
ganizers that the enforcement of two city ordinances which
prohibited the distribution of literature on the public streets and
required a permit from the Mayor prior to the leasing of any hall
for a public meeting was incompatible with the first amendment.28
The union obtained an injunction in a federal district court re-
straining the city officials from enforcing the ordinances. 29 In a
plurality opinion30 upholding the issuance of the injunction, the
Supreme Court scorned the Davis dictum by stating: "Wherever
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,.
24. For an excellent discussion of the first amendment and speech activities in
public places, see Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 Sup. CT.
REv. 1; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV.
233.
25. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
26. Id. at 48.
27. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
28. Id. at 501-02.
29. Committee for Indus. Org. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127 (D.N.J. 1938).
30. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Mr. Justice Roberts'
plurality opinion was joined only by Mr. Justice Black. The rest of the Court
split on a jurisdictional issue.
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have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought
between citizens, and discussing public questions." 31
The Davis notion was again confronted in Jamison v. Texas,32 a
case involving the conviction of a member of the Jehovahs' Wit-
nesses for the violation of a city ordinance which prohibited the
distribution of handbills in public places. Responding to the city's
Davis-based property rights arguments, Justice Black left no
doubt that those arguments were no longer persuasive:
[O]ne who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the
public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to ex-
press his views in an orderly fashion. This right extends to the communi-
cation of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken
word.
3 3
After Hague and Jamison, it was clear that speech activities in
public places were entitled to constitutional protection. Defining
the extent of that protection became the next task for the Court in
its efforts to develop a coherent theory of the public forum.
B. Scope of the Public Forum Theory
The Supreme Court's development of a public forum theory
and a test for determining the validity of government regulation of
speech activity in a public forum has been a complex process in-
volving many decisions which analyze distinct types of expressive
conduct. In discussing that process, this section of the Note will
begin with a case which illustrates the public forum theory seem-
ingly accepted by the Court prior to Heffiron and will trace the es-
sential elements of that theory back to the key cases which
spawned it.
In Grayned v. City of Rockford,34 a Negro student who was con-
victed under two city ordinances as a result of his involvement in a
demonstration next to a public school attacked the ordinances on
first amendment free speech grounds. The first ordinance forbade
picketing and demonstrating within 150 feet of any school building,
excluding a school involved in a labor dispute.3 5 The second ordi-
nance prohibited persons adjacent to any school building from
willfully making noise or creating a diversion which tended to dis-
turb the peace and good order of a school in session.3 6
The Court struck down the first ordinance on equal protection
31. Id. at 515 (dictum).
32. 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
33. Id. at 416.
34. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
35. Id. at 107.
36. Id. at 107-08.
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grounds37 and established a key precept of the public forum the-
ory: regulations based upon the content of speech are not permis-
sible to control speech activity in public places. 38 The ordinance
exempting labor picketers from its operation was such a content-
based regulation.
The anti-noise ordinance was upheld as a reasonable time,
place, and manner regulation of expressive activity.39 The Court
applied a three-step analysis to reach this result.40 This analysis
may be summarized as follows: First, the nature of the publicly
owned place 4' must be considered in light of the type of speech
activity that is being regulated.42 If the speech activity is found to
be appropriate, that is, compatible with the activity to which the
place is dedicated, the second step is to determine what govern-
ment interest is promoted by the regulation and whether it is legit-
imate.43  If the expressive activity is appropriate and the
government interest legitimate, the third step requires a determi-
nation of whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to further the
37. Id. at 107. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), was decided
the same day as Grayned and involved virtually the same anti-picketing ordi-
nance. The Court invalidated the ordinance on equal protection grounds and
the opinion contains the Court's full equal protection analysis which was ab-
breviated in Grayned. Mosley established that the equal protection clause
requires that statutes affecting first amendment interests be narrowly tai-
lored. The state interest promoted by the anti-picketing ordinance-the pre-
vention of school disruption-was not served by the regulation, which
discriminated among pickets based upon the content of the speech activity.
Id. at 101-02.
38. 408 U.S. at 107.
39. Id. at 117.
40. The language in the Grayned opinion from which this three-step analysis is
drawn reads as follows:
The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a partic-
ular time. Our cases make clear that in assessing the reasonableness
of a regulation, we must weigh heavily the fact that communication is
involved; the regulation must be narrowly tailored to further the
State's legitimate interest.
Id. at 116-17 (footnotes omitted).
41. Extension of the public forum concept to include private property has had a
checkered history. For example, in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the
Court held that the streets of a company-owned town were part of the public
forum and that speech activities conducted therein were entitled to first
amendment protection. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), the
Court rejected an attempt to include the hallways of a privately owned shop-
ping center in the public forum. But in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Rob-
bins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Court affirmed a California Supreme Court
decision which held that the California Constitution required the owners of
shopping centers to allow peaceful use of their premises for expressive
activities.
42. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
43. See id.
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government interest so that there is a minimal restriction of
speech activities.44
In Grayned, the Court finally developed a coherent test embod-
ying the key elements of its previous public forum decisions. A
short review of some of those decisions will illustrate the proper
application of the test.
1. The Nature of the Place and the Type of Speech Activity
Regulated
Almost all human activity is in some sense expressive con-
duct.45 A person can express similar ideas by a wide variety of ac-
tivities. For example, dissatisfaction with a political candidate
may be expressed by delivering a speech denouncing that candi-
date, by writing and distributing a leaflet attacking the views of
that candidate, or by drawing a pistol and assassinating that candi-
date. It is safe to say that while the first two activities may be ap-
propriate in many public places, the latter is never appropriate in
any place and is thus outside the range of first amendment
protection.
The initial inquiry under Grayned is whether the expressive ac-
tivity being regulated is appropriate for the place used as a forum.
Brown v. Louisiana46 provides an illustration of this prong of the
Grayned analysis. In Brown, five Negro men who silently stood in
the reading room of a segregated public library to protest racial
discrimination were convicted under a breach of the peace statute.
The Court held that the statute unconstitutionally violated the
men's first amendment rights of speech and assembly.47 The
Court stated: "[T] he circumstances here were such that no claim
can be made that use of the library by others was disturbed by the
demonstration.... Were it otherwise, a factor not present in this
case would have to be considered."48 Thus, the mode of protest the
men had chosen was appropriate to the public place involved.
Two closely related cases further illustrate the initial Grayned
inquiry. In Saia v. New York, 49 plaintiff challenged a city ordi-
nance which prohibited the use of sound amplification equipment
44. See id. at 116-17.
45. For a short, interesting discussion of the "speech pure" (generally oral or
written communication) and "speech plus" (picketing, parading, and other
symbolic speech) dichotomy, see Kalven, supra note 24, at 23-25.
46. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
47. Id. at 142.
48. Id. The Court seemed to be hinting that had the protest been a boisterous
one, disturbing other library patrons in their use of the facility, the first
amendment would offer no protection for the plaintiffs' activities.
49. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
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in public places without first obtaining a permit from the police
chief. The Court struck down the ordinance as an arbitrary grant
of power because it contained no guidelines for the police chief to
follow in exercising his permit-granting authority.5 0 However, in
dictum, the Court suggested that the use of loudspeakers might be
appropriate in some public places.5 1 One year later, in Kovacs v.
Cooper,5 2 the Court was forced to directly confront the issue and
determine if the use of sound trucks on the public streets to blare
out messages could be constitutionally prohibited. In upholding
the city ordinance which forbade the use of trucks mounted with
loudspeakers that emitted "loud and raucous noises," 53 the Court
recognized that voice amplication was not always an appropriate
type of expressive activity.5 4 The Court found that since the
message being transmitted was not confined to the streets, a tradi-
tional public forum, but carried over into private homes and busi-
nesses bordering the forum, the use of the sound trucks was
inappropriate for the forum involved and thus outside the sphere
of first amendment protection.SS
Distributing handbills and soliciting contributions for charita-
ble, religious, or political causes have consistently been found to
be appropriate speech activities in all public places.5 6 The
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have rejected total
bans on these activities in such diverse places as a performing arts
center,5 7 publicly owned office buildings,5 8 airports,5 9 national
50. Id. at 560.
51. The Court stated: "Loud-speakers are today indispensable instruments of ef-
fective public speech .... It is the way people are reached." Id. at 561.
52. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
53. Id. at 78.
54. Id. at 87.
55. Id.
56. Handbilling cases include: Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938). The seminal case which established that the solicitation of contri-
butions for religious and political causes is entitled to first amendment pro-
tection was Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Largent
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943). The rationale for first amendment protection for
the solicitation of funds for religious and charitable purposes has been ex-
plained by the Court as follows: "[Sjolicitation is characteristically inter-
twined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for
particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social is-
sues. .. ." Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632. See also Jones, Solicita-
tions--Charitable and Religious, 31 BAYLoR L. REV. 53 (1979).
57. United States v. Boesewetter, 463 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1978).
58. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. McAvey, 450 F. Supp.
1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
59. Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975).
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parks,60 rest areas along the interstate highway system,6 ' and the
streets and parks.62
2. Legitimate Government Interests Justifying Regulation
of Speech in Public Forums
Along with the government interest in assuring that the pri-
mary purposes of the public place being used as a forum are pre-
served,63 the Court has found that other government interests can
justify regulations of speech activities in a public forum. The sec-
ond prong of the Grayned analysis involves a determination of the
government interest being served by such a regulation and
whether it is legitimate.
The state interest in assuring the orderly flow of traffic upon the
streets and passageways of publicly owned buildings has consist-
ently been held to justify restrictions on expressive activities. Cox
v. New Hampshire64 established the legitimacy of such an interest.
In this case, persons wished to distribute a military publication in the O'Hare
airport. After being threatened with prosecution for trespass, the distribu-
tors successfully sued for an injunction which the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809
(5th Cir. 1979) which provides an exhaustive discussion of permissible air-
port regulations of speech activities. In the Fifth Circuit's view, permissible
regulations can include registration schemes, confining distributors of litera-
ture and solicitors of donations to certain areas in the airport, and requiring
that transfers of money occur only in designated solicitation booths. Id. at
834-40. See also International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Roch-
ford, 585 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1978) (O'Hare airport, registration scheme for solic-
itors and handbillers void for vagueness).
The Lincoln, Nebraska municipal airport regulations forbid the distribu-
tion of literature or solicitation of funds without first obtaining the permis-
sion of the executive director of the airport. LINcOLN, NEB., MUNICEPAL
AIRPORT REGULATIONS §§ J-5 to -7 (Nov. 1, 1972). These regulations could
most likely be successfully attacked as a discretionary licensing scheme simi-
lar to the one rejected in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). See notes 49-
51 & accompanying text supra. The Omaha, Nebraska airport regulations
which govern solicitation of contributions and distribution of literature were
attacked by ISKCON as an arbitrary licensing scheme. The regulations were
modified after ISKCON filed suit and ISKCON was awarded attorneys' fees.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc, v. Andersen, 569 F.2d
1027, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 1978).
60. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Kleppe, 592 F.2d 529
(9th Cir. 1979).
61. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Hays, 438 F. Supp. 1077
(S.M. Fla. 1977).
62. See cases cited in notes 32, 56 & accompanying text supra.
63. The Court has sanctioned complete bans on some expressive activities in cer-
tain publicly owned places in order to prevent interference with the primary
use of the place. Most notable are military installations, Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828 (1976), and jails, Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
64. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
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In Cox, five Jehovahs' Witnesses appealed their arrests and con-
victions, along with sixty-three others, for violating a city ordi-
nance which prohibited parades without a permit. The parade
permit ordinance was not open to a Saia-type attack as an arbi-
trary licensing scheme since it contained criteria related to public
safety and convenience for the officials to follow in granting per-
mits. 65 The Court, citing Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organ-
ization,66 recognized that the streets were a proper and traditional
forum for the Witnesses' activity, which involved a single-fie
march down the sidewalk, distributing leaflets, and carrying
signs. 67 Nevertheless, the Court approved the licensing scheme as
one that promoted the city's interest in assuring a safe and orderly
flow of traffic. 68
As illustrated in Kovacs v. Cooper,69 the protection of the pri-
vacy interests of those outside the public forum has likewise been
found a government interest sufficient to justify restrictions on
speech activities. A closely related interest was upheld in Lehman
v. Shaker Heights.70 The City of Shaker Heights had contracted
with a private advertising company for the operation of interior
signboards on the city's publicly owned bus system. One of the
contract provisions prohibited the acceptance of political ads. A
political candidate whose ad had been rejected by the advertising
company brought suit, claiming that the signboards were a public
forum and that the city's refusal to allow political advertising was
impermissible content regulation. Rejecting his claim, the Court
asserted that the privacy interests of those using the city transit
system by necessity warranted the restriction.7 1 This captive audi-
ence protection interest is probably of limited applicability and
has been rejected in other contexts.7 2
65. Id. at 576.
66. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
67. 312 U.S. at 574.
68. Id. at 576.
69. 336 U.S. 77 (1949). See notes 52-55 & accompanying text supra.
70. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
71. Id. at 302.
72. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in which the Court over-
turned the conviction under a breach of the peace statute of a young man
wearing a jacket emblazoned with profanity. Rejecting the state's captive au-
dience argument, the Court stated: 'The ability of government, consonant
with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hear-
ing it is... dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are
being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." Id. at 21. See also Pub-
lic Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (Court rejected first and fifth
amendment attacks upon a Washington, D.C. transit company's practice of
channelling radio broadcasts into its buses and streetcars); Stone, supra note
24 (written in response to the Court's decision in Lehman).
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Two other government interests asserted by state officials to
justify regulations of speech activities in public places have been
rejected by the Court as insufficient. In Schneider v. New Jersey,73
the Court invalidated three municipal ordinances which prohib-
ited the distribution of handbills, finding insufficient the munici-
palities' assertions that the ordinances assured cleaner municipal
streets. And in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Envi-
ronment,7 4 the Court invalidated a municipal ordinance which pro-
hibited the solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations
that did not dedicate seventy-five percent of their receipts to chari-
table purposes. The Court found that the state interest in prevent-
ing fraudulent misrepresentation did not warrant such a
restriction on first amendment activity.7 -
It would be incorrect to say that the interests asserted by the
states in Schneider and Schaumburg were not legitimate. How-
ever, the interests could be served by less drastic means than the
total bans on the particular types of expressive activities which the
ordinances in the two cases effected. This leads into the third part
of the Grayned analysis.
3. Narrowly Tailored Regulations of Speech Activities in
Public Forums
The final step in the Grayned analysis requires that a regula-
tion of speech activity be narrow in scope.7 6 In Schneider, the
Court found that the interest in clean streets could adequately be
assured by punishing those who littered.77 In Schaumburg, the
Court held that fraudulently procured charitable contributions
could be prevented by punishing those who engaged in such activ-
ity.78 Broad, prophylactic restrictions on speech activities such as
handbilling have consistently been struck down. 79 While the
Court has upheld regulations of speech activities, such as in
Grayned, which prohibited the making of noise or the creation of a
disturbance,8 0 it has rejected regulations which prohibited certain
types of traditional means of expression.S1 The Court has consist-
73. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
74. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
75. Id. at 639.
76. See notes 40.44 & accompanying text supra.
77. 308 U.S. at 162.
78. 444 U.S. at 639.
79. See notes 56-62 & accompanying text supra.
80. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (voice amplification
equipment).
81. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (solicitation of contribu-
tions); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (handbilling). See notes
56-62 & accompanying text upra.
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ently required that the aim of regulations be narrowed to include
only those persons who frustrate the achievement of a legitimate
state interest 82 and to allow those who express themselves in an
orderly manner to do so.83
A corollary to the requirement that regulations of speech activ-
ity be narrowly tailored is that state schemes for licensing expres-
sive activity contain objective criteria to guide the state official
responsible for issuing permits. Schemes which grant unbridled
discretion to such officials have consistently been struck down, as
illustrated in Saia v. New York 84 and Hague v. Committee for In-
dustrial Organization.85
Cox v. Louisiana86 represents a further extension of this prin-
ciple. In Cox, a civil rights activist was convicted of violating a
state statute which prohibited the obstruction of public passage-
ways. Cox had organized and participated in a civil rights demon-
stration which included a march from a Baton Rouge courthouse to
a segregated diner. While the statute on its face precluded all
street assemblies and parades, 87 the city officials had allowed
other groups to parade on the streets without arrest and convic-
tion.88 The Court overturned the conviction on first amendment
and due process grounds, explaining: "The situation is thus the
same as if the statute itself expressly provided that there could
only be peaceful parades or demonstrations in the unbridled dis-
cretion of the local officials." 89 The Court expressly left open the
82. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)
(prevention of fraudulently induced contributions can be achieved by pun-
ishing those who engage in fraudulent misrepresentations instead of forbid-
ding charitable solicitations generally); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (assuring that the streets are clean can be achieved by punishing
those who litter instead of prohibiting all distribution of handbills).
83. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (silent protest).
84. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
85. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
86. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
87. Id. at 555-56. The statute provided:
No person shall wilfully obstruct the free, convenient and normal
use of any public sidewalk, street, highway, bridge, alley, road, or
other passageway, or the entrance, corridor or passage of any public
building, structure, watercraft or ferry, by impeding, hindering, sti-
fling, retarding or restraining traffic or passage thereon or therein.
Providing however nothing herein contained shall apply to a bona
fide legitimate labor organization or to any of its legal activities such
as picketing, lawful assembly or concerted activity in the interest of
its members for the purpose of accomplishing or securing more
favorable wage standards, hours of employment and working
conditions.
Id. at 553 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 14.100.1 (Cum. Supp. 1962)).
88. 379 U.S. at 556-57.
89. Id. at 557-58.
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question of whether a total ban on public gatherings on the streets
and in other public facilities would be constitutionally
permissible.90
Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. 91 represents the Court's first approval of a ban on handbilling
and solicitation of contributions in a public forum suitable for such
activity. Its sanction of the Minnesota Agricultural Society's booth
rule indicates a need to examine the process the Court used to
reach its decision and to determine if the Grayned approach to the
public forum theory is still embraced by a majority of the Court.
IV. ANALYSIS OF HEFFRON
In Heffron, the Court departed from the three-step analysis of
Grayned92 which had assembled the diverse principles found in
the Court's previous public forum cases. This section of the Note
will apply the Grayned analysis to the facts of Heffron and indicate
where the Court departed from that analysis.
In Heffron, the Court was presented with an unusual situation
in that the expressive activity being regulated was the activity to
which the public place was dedicated. A state "fair is almost by
definition a congeries of hawkers, vendors of wares and services,
and purveyors of ideas, commercial, esthetic and intellectual."93
The state fairgrounds is a classic, almost pure example of a public
forum. It is a place dedicated to the transfer of information. ISK-
CON members' distribution of literature and solicitation of dona-
tions, activities both banned from the open areas of the
fairgrounds and confined to fixed leased locations by the booth
rule, was expressive conduct appropriate to the forum. Thus the
first prong of the Grayned analysis was met in an almost tautologi-
cal manner.
The second prong of the Grayned analysis requires a determi-
nation of the legitimacy of the state interest being promoted by the
booth rule. State fair officials presented three interests which the
rule allegedly promoted.9 4 The first interest asserted was the pre-
vention of fraudulent misrepresentations by roving solicitors.9 5
State fair officials felt that by confining ISKCON devotees and
others who solicited contributions to fixed locations, they could
more easily police the solicitation activities to prevent fraudulently
90. Id. at 555.
91. 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981).
92. See notes 40-44 & accompanying text supra.
93. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. State Fair of Texas, 461 F.
Supp. 719, 721 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
94. 101 S. Ct. at 2565.
95. Id.
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induced donations. 96 The second interest asserted by the state of-
ficials was the protection of the privacy interests of all fair patrons
by preventing them from being approached by roving handbillers
and solicitors. 97 The last interest asserted by the state officials,
and the one solely relied upon by the Court, was the promotion of
an orderly and safe state fair.98
The state's interest in assuring orderly traffic on the state fair-
grounds was a type of interest which had long been accepted as
legitimate.99 Thus, in relying on that interest as sufficient justifica-
tion for the booth rule, the Court was on solid Grayned ground.
However, when the third step of the Grayned analysis is ap-
plied, the Court's decision becomes subject to attack. In Heffron,
Justice White's majority opinion dismissed in a single paragraph
the possibility that the state's interest could be served by a less
broad, more closely tailored rule than one effecting a total ban on
the distribution and solicitation activities of ISKCON members
and other persons from the open areas of the state fairgrounds.100
By failing to carefully consider whether a more narrowly drafted
rule could adequately promote the state's interest in crowd con-
trol, the Court in effect dropped the first amendment out of its
analysis, for it is the third step of the Grayned formulation that
reflects a sensitivity to the freedom of speech protection embodied
in that amendment.' 0 '
96. Id. at 2565 n.13.
97. Id.
98. Id. The Court viewed the interest of assuring an orderly movement of per-
sons on the fairgrounds as sufficient to justify the booth rule and thus felt it
unnecessary to discuss the other asserted interests. Id. For a discussion of
cases addressing state interests in protecting privacy and preventing fraud,
see notes 52-55, 74-75 & accompanying text supra.
99. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Paulos v. New Hamp-
shire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); notes 64-68 & accompanying text supra.
100. 101 S. Ct. at 2567. Justice White stated:
[W] e cannot agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court that Rule 6.05
is an unnecessary regulation because the State could avoid the
threat to its interest posed by ISKCON by less restrictive means,
such as penalizing disorder or disruption, limiting the number of so-
licitors, or putting more narrowly drawn restrictions on the location
and movement of ISKCON's representatives. As we have indicated,
the inquiry must involve not only ISKCON, but also all other organi-
zations that would be entitled to distribute, sell or solicit if the booth
rule may not be enforced with respect to ISKCON. Looked at in this
way, it is quite improbable that the alternative means suggested by
the Minnesota Supreme Court would deal adequately with the
problems posed by the much larger number of distributors and solic-
itors that would be present on the fairgrounds if the judgment below
were affirmed.
Id.
101. See Kalven, supra note 24, at 28, where the author stated that when balancing
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To determine whether a narrower rule than the booth rule
would serve the state's interest in crowd control, the types of activ-
ities which were regulated by the rule must be distinguished. The
rule most importantly served to confine sellers and exhibitors of
merchandise, whether farm equipment or kitchen utensils, to fixed
locations, allowing the crowds of people to come to them and thus
preventing the havoc that would result if no such scheme existed.
The other type of activity controlled by the rule was the distri-
bution of literature and solicitation of contributions. The rule did
not prohibit persons from approaching others and proselytizing
their causes.1 0 2 Nor did the rule prohibit a person from stationing
himself in the fairgrounds and drawing a huge throng of persons
by making a speech. What the rule did prohibit was the transfer of
anything besides orally expressed ideas. Yet the Court failed to
discuss how the state's interest in crowd control was further dam-
aged by the transfer of a handbill or a dollar bill once a person had
already stopped and engaged another in conversation. As Justice
Blackmun noted in his dissent:
The distribution of literature does not require that the recipient stop in
order to receive the message the speaker wishes to convey; instead, the
recipient is free to read the message at a later time. For this reason, litera-
ture distribution may present even fewer crowd control problems than the
oral proselytizing that the State already allows upon the fairgrounds. 1 03
The Court's failure to distinguish between the types of activi-
ties regulated by the booth rule resulted in an assertion that in the
absence of the rule, the fair could not be presented in an orderly
fashion. 0 4 This is undoubtedly true. However, the Court should
have focused on whether a narrower rule could have served the
state's interest rather than dwelling upon the effect of the absence
of the rule. The Court did not adequately consider the possibility
that a rule limiting the number of distributors of literature or keep-
ing them away from highly traveled entrances and exits could ade-
quately serve the state's interest.105 This failure reflects little
the state's interest in enforcing speech regulation with the first amendment
interest in free speech, the scale is loaded in favor of free speech. To use
Kalven's metaphor, the thumb of the Court should be on the speech side of
the scales. Id. It can be said that thumb of the Court slipped in Heffron.
102. 101 S. Ct. at 2567. See note 7 supra.
103. 101 S. Ct. at 2572-73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2566. The Court raised the spectre that if it overturned the booth rule
with respect to the distribution of literature and solicitation of contributions,
it might be forced to invalidate the rule as applied to commercial vendors and
distributors as well. Id. The Court also concluded that if the distribution of
literature and the solicitation of contributions were exempted from confine-
ment, there would necessarily be a large number of handbillers and solicitors
in the open areas of the fairgrounds. Id. at 2567.
105. For example, the Nebraska State Fair regulations provide, in relevant part:
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sympathy for the proposition that information should be ex-
changed freely with minimal government regulation.106
Not only is Heffron notable for the Court's departure from the
Grayned model, but it is also the first case involving a regulation of
speech activity in a public forum which introduces the existence of
ample "alternative forums" 0 7 as a decisive criterion. Justice
White and four other members of the Court felt the rule was fur-
ther justified because it did not prevent ISKCON devotees from
engaging in their proselytizing ritual outside the fairgrounds and
because ISKCON's activities could be conducted from fixed leased
FAIRBOARD: SOLCITATION RULE
Bonafide religious organizations may be permitted to distribute
their literature and/or solicit donations on the Fairgrounds during
the term of the Nebraska State Fair, subject to the following.
(a) Any group desiring to distribute literature or solicit dona-
tions pursuant to this rule must make an application to the fair man-
ager for permission to do so at least sixty days in advance of the
opening of the Nebraska State Fair.
(b) Said distribution of literature or solicitation of donations
shall not be permitted within any building on the Fairgrounds, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the Entertainment Complex and the
Grandstand.
(c) Said distribution of literature or solicitation of donations
shall not be permitted so close to any exit or entrance to the Fair or
to any building so as to obstruct said entrance or exit.
(d) No more than ten individuals representing any one organiza-
tion or 30 individuals representing all organizations will be permitted
to distribute literature or solicit donations pursuant to this rule at
any one time. If necessary the fair manager will further limit the
number of individuals soliciting donations or distributing literature
on behalf of any one organization in order to permit all organizations
equal access to the fairgrounds.
(e) Any individual who wishes to distribute literature or solicit
donations pursuant to this rule must register his or her name and
organization with the manager of the fair. An identification card will
be prepared for each individual by the manager authorizing him or
her to engage in said activity on the date or dates shown on the iden-
tification card. The identification card must be worn in a prominent
place by every individual engaged in the distribution of literature or
solicitation of donations pursuant to this rule.
(f) No individual shall be permitted to distribute literature or
solicit funds except pursuant to this rule.
(g) With the exception that individuals distributing literature or
soliciting donations pursuant to this rule shall not be required to
lease a booth, such individuals are subject to all other rules and regu-
lations applicable to exhibitors and concessionaires generally.
The Nebraska State Fair Premium List 7 (1981) (available at the office of the
Nebraska State Fair Manager, Lincoln, Neb.). The regulation on its face clas-
sifies speech by its content and only religious speech is permitted outside
booths. The regulation may be open to a content-based regulation attack.
See notes 37-38 & accompanying text supra.
106. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
107. 101 S. Ct. at 2567.
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locations on the fairgrounds.108 The ample alternative forum fac-
tor was drawn from dictum in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,109 a decision involving
the validity of a state regulation prohibiting price advertising of
prescription drugs.
The Court's adoption of the ample alternative forum inquiry is
contrary to the thrust of previous public forum cases and if fol-
lowed in future cases will introduce a new factor heretofore not
considered. The previous inquiry was always "is the speech activ-
ity appropriate to this place"? This inquiry does not involve a con-
sideration of the availability of other possible forums. The
possibility that one could speak in places other than the one cho-
sen has never previously justified regulations of the public forum.
As the Court stated in Schneider v. New Jersey:110 "[O]ne is not to
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place.""'
V. CONCLUSION
It is unclear if ISKCON's controversial reputation, which
stemmed from allegations that its members had engaged in fraud-
ulent solicitation tactics," 2 was an unstated influence upon the
Heffron Court in its short-circuiting of the Grayned approach. If
so, the Court has perhaps only damaged its integrity. However, if
Heffron signals a change from the narrowly tailored regulation re-
108. Id.
109. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Heffron Court stated: "'We have often approved re-
strictions of that kind provided that they are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental
interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information."' 101 S. Ct. at 2564 (quoting Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976). See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), where the
Court used an "alternative avenues of communication analysis." Id. at 567.
Lloyd involved a claim by distributors of anti-war leafletters that the hall-
ways of a privately owned shopping center were part of the public forum, and
thus their leafletting activity there was subject to first amendment protection.
The Court rejected this claim, and the alternative avenues of communication
seemed to play some role in the Court's decision. However, there is an added
consideration involved when the Court is asked to extend the public forum
onto private property: the owner of the property is being deprived of prop-
erty in the 5th and 14th amendment sense. Id. at 570. There is no such con-
sideration when the use of publicly owned property as a forum is involved.
110. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
111. Id. at 163.
112. See Amicus Brief for the County of Los Angeles at 9-17; Amicus Brief for the
State of New York at 16-25, Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981).
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quirement embodied in Grayned to an ample alternative forum in-
quiry, the first amendment rights of ISKCON devotees and of all
who wish to use the public forum to receive and communicate
ideas have been diluted.
Glen R. Anstine II '83
